On
this date, 19 August 1939, Joseph Stalin gave an alleged Speech. I will post
information from Wikipedia and other links.
Joseph Stalin on Killing People
[PHOTO SOURCE: http://www.pinterest.com/glachance/quotes/]
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This
article covers a speech allegedly given by leader of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin on 19 August 1939 to
members of the Politburo, wherein he
supposedly described the strategy of the Soviet Union on the eve of World War II.
The
historicity of the speech is still the subject of academic debate. Plausible
textual evidence of this speech found in various reputable archives has been
academically studied and published, however no formal first-hand evidence of a
Politburo meeting held on 19 August 1939 or the delivery of the quoted speech
has yet been proven. Speeches given in secret were common at the time, the
Politburo being a closed and secretive body. There are also contrary views that
these copies were intended originally as propaganda and disinformation.
Accordingly until consensus is reached by historians, the discussion of the
documents supporting such a thesis are described in this article as an
"alleged" speech.
In
these reports, Stalin is represented as talking about his strategic view of the
growing conflict in Europe, and his view that it would be beneficial for the
Soviet agenda, insofar as it would weaken the West, allowing possible
territorial expansion.
Summary of documents
In
the source material available to historians, Stalin is represented as
expressing an expectation that the war would be the best opportunity to weaken
both the Western nations and Nazi Germany, and make Germany suitable for "Sovietization".
There is also expectation of eventual territorial expansion to the Baltic
countries, Finland and Poland, with the approval of either the Western powers
or Germany.
Historians
who have studied these documents have suggested that if such a speech took
place, which is usually considered plausible but not proven (see below), then
this view may have formed the basis for the Nazi-Soviet pact of non-aggression
signed in 1939, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which was also signed
days later around 23 – 24 August 1939.
Source material and
timeline
First published in 1939
The
first version of this speech was published, partially, on 28 November 1939, in
the Paris newspaper Le Temps by the news agency Havas despatch
from Geneva. Since then several versions, varying in content, have been in
circulation.
Stalin denies the news
in Pravda
In Pravda of
30 November 1939, the day of the outbreak of the Winter War,
Stalin was asked for his opinion on the report of "the speech"
allegedly made "by Stalin to the Politburo on 19 August", in which he
is said to have expressed the thought that the war should go on as long as
possible, so that the belligerents are exhausted." Stalin stated this was
an incorrect assertion, and was quoted by Pravda as saying:
1.
that it cannot be denied that it was France and
England that attacked Germany and consequently they are responsible for the
present war;
2.
that Germany made peace proposals to France and
England, proposals supported by the Soviet Union on the grounds that a quick
end to the war would ease the situation of all countries and peoples;
3.
that the ruling circles of England and France
rudely rejected Germany's peace proposals.
Refound and authenticity
issues
In 1994,
Russian publicist Tatiana S. Bushuyeva published an archival reference because
of the speech in an article printed in the Novy Mir magazine (#12,
1994), based on what she claimed was recent findings in Soviet Special Archives
of a text that according to her was supposedly recorded by a Comintern member
present at the meeting.
The
actual original text is not available yet. Bushuyeva also printed a Russian
translation of a version available in French. This caused another surge of
speculations on the issue. Bushuyeva omitted to mention that the referred
archival record was from stock related to the documents of General Staff of the
French Army.
Historicity and
debate
Whether
this speech was ever given by Stalin is still the subject of dispute by
historians and no proof is as yet unanimously accepted. According to Viktor
Suvorov's book M-Day, Soviet historians laid special emphasis on proving
that no Politburo meeting took place on 19 August 1939. Nevertheless, Suvorov
states in his book that Russian military historian Dmitri Volkogonov has found
evidence that a meeting really took place on that day.
An
article in the Otechestvennaya Istoriya ((History of the Fatherland),
Отечественная история, 2004, № 1) by Sergey Sluch (С.З. Случ) critically
reviews the history of "Stalin's Speech", its textological analysis,
and possible reasons and sources for the possible forgery. Carl Nordling, a
Finnish statistician and amateur historian, pointed out some counter-theses to
Sluch's disapproval of the existence of such a speech.
See also
- Viktor Suvorov, a controversial historian who used the speech as an evidence for his thesis in works such as Icebreaker
- Stalin's Missed Chance, a research work by military historian Mikhail Meltyukhov, covering Stalin's alleged offensive plans
Pol Pot meets Hitler & Stalin in hell!
[PHOTO SOURCE: http://mp.natlib.govt.nz/detail/?id=13753&l=en]
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INTERNET SOURCE: http://www.carlonordling.se/ww2/stalin_speech_complete.html
Stalin's speech to the Politburo on 19 August 1939,
reconstructed from renderings in Novyi
Mir, Moscow, and Revue de Droit
International, Geneva
Pieced together by Carl O. Nordling, Sweden.
Boldface = in both versions
Normal = only in Novyi Mir
Italics = only in Revue de Droit
International
The question of war and peace has entered a critical phase for us. Its solution depends entirely on the
position which will be taken by the Soviet Union. We are absolutely convinced
that if we conclude a mutual
assistance pact with France and Great Britain, Germany will back off from
Poland and seek a modus vivendi with the Western Powers. War would be avoided,
but further events could prove dangerous for the USSR.
On the
other hand, if we accept Germany's
proposal, that you know, and conclude a non-aggression pact with
her, she will certainly invade Poland, and the intervention of France and
England is then unavoidable. Western Europe would be subjected to serious
upheavals and disorder. In this case we
will have a great opportunity to stay out of the conflict, and we could plan
the opportune time for us to enter the war.
The
experience of the last 20 years has shown that in peacetime the Communist
movement is never strong enough for the Bolshevik Party to seize power. The
dictatorship of such a Party will only become possible as the result of a major
war.
Our choice is clear. We must
accept the German proposal and, with a
refusal, politely send the Anglo-French
mission home.
It is not difficult to envisage
the importance which we would obtain in this way of proceeding. It is obvious,
for us, that Poland will be destroyed even before England and France are able
to come to her assistance. In this case Germany will cede to us a part of
Poland… Our immediate advantage will be
to take Poland all the way to the gates of Warsaw, as well as Ukrainian Galicia.
Germany grants us full freedom of
action in the
Pribaltic/three Baltic States and recognizes
our claim on Bessarabia. She is prepared to acknowledge our interests in
Romania Bulgaria and Hungary.
Yugoslavia remains an open
question, the solution of which depends on the position
taken by Italy. If Italy remains at the sides of Germany, then the latter will
require that Yugoslavia be understood as her zone of influence, and it is also
by Yugoslavia that she will obtain access to the Adriatic Sea. But if Italy does not go with Germany, then the latter will depend on
Italy for her access to the Adriatic Sea, and in this case Yugoslavia
will pass into our sphere of influence.
This in case that Germany would
emerge victorious from the war. We must, however, envisage the possibilities that
will result from the defeat as well as from the victory of
Germany. In case of her defeat, a
Sovietization of Germany will unavoidably occur and a Communist government will
be created. We should not forget that a Sovietized Germany would bring about
great danger, if this Sovietization is the result of German defeat in a
transient war. England and France will
still be strong enough to seize Berlin and to destroy a Soviet Germany. We would be unable to come effectually to
her assistance/to the aid of our Bolshevik comrades in Germany.
Therefore, our goal is that
Germany should carry out the war as long as possible so that England and France
grow weary and become exhausted to such a degree that they are no longer in a
position to put down a
Sovietized Germany.
Our position is this. Maintaining
neutrality and waiting for the right time, the USSR will presently assist Germany economically and supply her with raw materials and provisions. It goes without saying that our
assistance should not exceed a certain limit; we must not send so much as to weaken our economy or the power of our
army.
At the same time we must carry on
active Communist propaganda in the Anglo-French bloc, and predominantly in
France. We must expect that in that country in times of war, the Party should
quit the legal means of warfare and turn underground. We know that their work will demand much money/great sacrifices, but
we must agree without hesitating to these sacrifices/our French comrades
will not hesitate. Their first task will be to decompose and demoralize the
army and the police. If this preparatory
work is fulfilled properly, the safety of Soviet Germany will be assured, and this will contribute to the
Sovietization of France.
For the
realization of these plans it is essential that the war continue for as long as
possible, and all forces, which we have available in Western Europe and the
Balkans, should be directed toward this goal.
Now let us consider the second
possibility, a German victory. Some think that this would confront us with a serious
danger. There is some truth in this, but it would be a mistake to regard the
danger as so close at hand or as great as has been proposed.
If Germany should prove to be
victorious, she will leave the war too weakened to start a war with the USSR
within a decade at least. She will have to supervise the occupation
of France and England and to prevent
their restoration/restore herself.
In addition, a victorious Germany
will have vast colonies/territories;
the exploitation of those and their adaptation to German methods will also
absorb Germany during several decades.
Obviously, this Germany will be
too busy elsewhere to turn against us. There is one additional thing that will strengthen our safety. In a conquered France, the French Communist
Party will always be very strong.
A Communist revolution will unavoidably break out, and we will be able to
exploit the situation and to come to the aid of France and make her our ally.
In addition, all the nations that fall under the "protection" of a
victorious Germany will become our allies. This presents for us a broad field
of action for the initiation of world revolution.
Comrades, I have
presented my considerations to you. I repeat that it is in the interest of the USSR, the workers' homeland that a war breaks out between the Reich and
the capitalist Anglo-French bloc. It is essential for us/Everything
should be done so that it drags out as
long as possible with the goal of weakening both sides. For this reason, it is imperative that we
agree to conclude the pact proposed by Germany, and then work in such a way
that this war, once it is declared,
will be prolonged maximally. We must strengthen our economic/propaganda work in
the belligerent countries, in order to be prepared when the war ends.
(For the original text
published in Revue de Droit International, see Stalin’s
August 1939 Speech, French version; and for the version published in
Novyi Mir, see Stalin’s
August 1939 Speech, Russian version. The essence of the speech
agrees with the arguments presented in the circular published in the Svenska Pressen, Helsinki, on 8
September 1939, see Stalin's politburo
explains Ribbentrop pact.)
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